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A b s t r a c t : f o r c r i t i c a l i t y consequences f o r t h e Tank Farm S a f e t y A n a l y s i s Report (FSAR)
. o f t h e a n a l y s i s methods are provided. Reference h e r e i n t o any s p e c i f i c c m r c i a l product, process, o r service by
The purpose o f t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n n o t e i s t o p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s C r i t i c a l i t y scenario i s developed and d e t a i l s and d e s c r i p t i o n
To o b t a i n copies of t h i s d o c e n t , contact: UHCIBCS ALLbL 9 -- Purpose -Although no credible scenario has been identified leading to a criticality in a waste tank, DCRT, catch tank, or 2 0 0 series tank or in a mistransfer from PFP, such a criticality is presumed and its consequences are calculated in this section.
Assumptions -The quantity of the transferred waste to be analyzed was chosen to be 500 liters of a 10 g Pu/L solution. This solution is transferred at 4.7 L/s (75 gal/min). The concentration and quantity is based on an estimate of the quantity of plutonium that could conceivably be transferred from PFP providing that multiple failures occurred. Transfers of a higher plutonium concentration would be overly conservative. Lower plutonium concentrations would require too large of a critical volume to occur. A concentration of 10 g Pu/L could constitute a critical sphere with reasonable diameter and size.
Scenario -It is assumed, notwithstanding the inordinate number of failures required, that a solution containing thousands of grams of plutonium accumulates in PAP waste receiver tank D-8 through repeated and undetected sequential process upsets to a previously empty tank. If the tank is not originally empty or other waste is dumped into the tank between the process upsets, the waste would be diluted causing a decrease in the Pu concentration. The contents of D-8 are then transferred to D -5 . Both these tanks have a diameter of over 3m and require over 1 8 kg of Pu to achieve an areal density of 2 . 6 kg Pu/m2, the minimum for a criticality. Since the waste transfer contains only 5 kg of Pu, there is no criticality in either D-8 or D-5 for this size transfer. The contents of tank D-5 are routed to a previously empty 244-TX DCRT. The transferred waste will not go critical in 244-TX since this tank has an even larger surface area than tank D-5. When the PFP waste is transferred to the DST, the waste is postulated to form a compact spherical shape in the existing waste. The radius of this sphere is assumed to increase until a critical volume is reached.
With the criticality, there is a fission burst followed by a rapid shutdown. The shutdown is effected as a consequence of fission energy release that results in thermal expansion, density reduction from the formation of very small bubbles, and fissile dilution through mixing from convective currents with expulsion of part of the critical mass. are formed. As the burst continues, the amount of dissolved gas increases enough to support the formation and expansion of larger bubbles.
Early in the burst, the small bubbles As the burst is terminated, there is a sudden internal pressure relief resulting in rapid steam production and the release of the dissolved gases. The gases and steam, along with the fission gas and a fraction of the waste, are carried into the headspace of the tank. The increase in the pressure in the headspace is relieved by venting a fraction of the headspace through HEPA filters. The pressure of the steam will also cause the critical volume to expand and disperse. The tank is large compared with the critical volume and the expansion will result in dilution of the fissile bearing volume. The turbulent and chaotic conditions along with the dilution should perturb fissile bearing volume sufficiently that reassembly into a new critical mass is not reasonable. The DST criticality is therefore modeled as a single burst.
Input Data
Accidental Transfer of 500 liter of 10 gniter Pu solution transferred to DST at a rate of 75 gallons per min. Since the critical volume for a 10 g Pu/liter solution has been calculated to be 300 L (Rogers 1996) with a radius of 41.5 cm, the transfer of 500 liters is potentially enough to reach a critical condition. At the fill rate of 4.1 L/sec, it takes 6 3 seconds to reach this condition. The kef, of the sphere during the fill is a function of the sphere radius and can be calculated. The kef, of the sphere during the fill as a function of the sphere radius can be calculated from the following equation.
75,g
Nuclear constants assumed for dilute
K effective calculated from k infinity and twogroup buckling. K infinity chosen to give k = 1 at critical radius.
This equation can be used to find the reactivity insertion rate as the sphere goes critical. The reactivity insertion rate, typically expressed in $/sec, is a measure of the rate at which the number of fissions is increasing. In the limit of a small change, the reactivity insertion rate is the change in reactivity for a small increase in the sphere radius divided by the time required for the radius to increase. The rate at which the radius increases is a function of the fill rate. From the following equation, the reactivity insertion rates for the 10 g Pu/L sphere at critical radius of are 41.5 cm is 0.57 $/sec. m m
It is possible to predict the neutronic response to a reactivity driving function by using point kinetics, as long as appropriate feedback models are employed. For small systems (with tight spatial coupling), this method has produced results that replicate both experimentally measured power and pressure curves reasonably well as shown in the reference (Hetrick 1993) for both dilute plutonium and uranium solutions. These calculations are compared to critical solution excursions measured at Silene. Hetrick's point kinetics model for fissile solutions includes both the Doppler feedback (fissionable material temperature) effect and the feedback associated with the change in volume of the system. The change in volume includes thermal expansion of the fluid as well as radiolytical gas bubble formation.
For pure plutonium and very highly enriched uranium systems, it is expected that the Doppler coefficient is either nearly zero, or may in fact be positive. This is because neutron absorption resonances also include a dominant fission component, and the Doppler broadening of these resonances may increase neutron production faster than the increase in neutron loss (Hetrick 1971) . For fast transients, the radiolytic gas bubble generation rate may dominate the thermal expansion effect, and so this will be a significant feedback effect for solution criticalities. The gas generation rate is calculated by using the G value for the solution, which is the quantity of gas produced per amount of energy deposited by fission in the solution. amount of energy deposition is required before the solution becomes saturated and large bubbles begin to form
There is a threshold effect, and so some One of the cases described in the reference (Hetrick 1993) can be used for estimating the postulated tank farm criticality energy release. The particular Hetrick case of interest involves a transient for a one-region plutonium solution in a cylindrical geometry with a radius of 40 cm. The fuel concentration is 10.5 g/liter. Hetrick calculated a neutron temperature coefficient of reactivity and a volume expansion coefficient from multi-group cross sections using transport theory. The power and reactivity for a step reactivity input of 4 $ were reported. After some initial positive feedback from rising system temperature, the transient terminates rapidly with the formation of radiolytic gas. The maximum inertial pressure for the pulse is 0.58 MPa and the energy yield is 89 MJ.
The DST waste criticality has a similar volume and Pu concentration as the Hetrick's calculation. The hypothetical waste tank criticality, if it did occur, would occur in a fluid with a G value reasonably close to water. The temperature and volume expansion coefficients should be comparable with the Hetrick calculation. Since the DST criticality reactivity insertion rate is under 1 S/sec, compared to the 4$ step increase in reactivity assumed in the Hetrick calculation, the energy yield and pressure for the DST criticality will be conservatively bounded by the calculated Hetrick transient.
Based on the similarity of the postulated DST criticality with the calculations performed by Hetrick, it is assumed that 89 MJ of energy (equivalent to 2.62 x 1018 fissions) is released in the DST criticality with inertial pressures of about 0.6 MPa. Most of the 89 MJ of fission energy goes into heating the liquid within the critical volume. The temperature of the fissile bearing volume is increased from the power burst until the saturation temperature is reached and steam is generated. About 75% of 89 MJ is needed to raise the liquid temperature from a DST liquid temperature of 48oC to boiling. This leaves 25% (or 22 MJ) available to create steam. A volume of 15.4 m3 of steam is produced, raising the pressure in the headspace of a full DST by about 1.5 kPa (6.0 inches of H,O 
Release Amounts
Source Term Analysis -The dose consequences result from the release of radioactive noble gases, iodine, and aerosolized plutonium and tank waste. The source term for the tank waste and plutonium identifies the amount of material released to the environment. The methodology and atmospheric constants used with this source term to calculate dose consequences are described in WHC-SD-WM-SARR-037. Effective dose equivalent per unit intake (lung clearance class W) for ~~2 3 9 is 1.16 x 10-4 Sv/Bq (EPA 1988). These results can be used to calculate consequences for this accident by making corrections for the different power levels. Since the consequences are a linear function of the number of fissions, the GENII consequences for the fission gases submersion and inhalation are ratioed by either the power o r the number of total fissions ( 2 . 8 x and 1 x l o i 9 ) to get consequences for the DST criticality. See CalcNote WHC-SD-WM-CN-067 for dose calculations (Huang, CH 1996) Offsite guideline for "extremely unlikely" event
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Toxicological Consequences
The toxicological consequences sum-of-fractions methodology is described in reference WHC (1996a) . Using the previously calculated value of 6.6 x 1 0 -5 liters of DST liquid released to the environment in a puff release, the calculated onsite and offsite toxicological consequences are: The SoF are normalized such that if the product of the SoF and the release amount is less than 1, the Risk Guidelines are met. Risk guidelines are therefore met for this event.
Comparison to Risk Guidelines
Although no credible scenario has been identified for this accident implying a frequency beyond the "extremely unlikely" range (less than 10-61, both the onsite and offsite radiological doses are shown to be acceptable for an accident in the "extremely unlikely" range (frequency of 10-4 to 10-6 per year). The toxicological sun-of-fractions are below one for an "extremely unlikely" event, and hence well below the risk evaluation guidelines, for both onsite and offsite receptors.
Small tank Criticality Criticality in D-8
For a criticality to occur in a DST in the tank farm from a PFP transfer, there must be a failure to sample and record the transfer and the size of the transfer must also be limited to tens to hundreds of liters. A larger transfer has the potential for criticality occurring in the PFP receiver tank, D-8, D-5, o r DCRT, 241-TX-244 before the waste reaches the DST. Receiver Tank D-8 diameter is 10 R.
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